bg es cs da de et el en fr hr it lv lt hu mt nl pl pt ro sk sl fi sv

The General Court examines for the first time the impact of systemic or generalised deficiencies in the rule of law in a Member State on determining the competition authority that is best placed to examine a complaint

In the context of the exercise of activities in the forwarding services sector, the company established under Polish law Sped-Pro S.A. (‘the applicant’) used rail freight transport services supplied by PKP Cargo S.A., a company controlled by the Polish State. On 4 November 2016, the applicant lodged a complaint against PKP Cargo with the European Commission. In that complaint, it submitted that PKP Cargo had abused its dominant position on the market for rail freight transport services in Poland on account of its alleged refusal to conclude with the applicant a multi-annual cooperation agreement on market conditions. On 12 August 2019, the Commission rejected the complaint by Decision C(2019) 6099 final (‘the contested decision’), 1 on the ground, in essence, that the Polish competition authority was best placed to examine it.

It is in those circumstances that the applicant brought an action before the General Court seeking annulment of the contested decision. In support of its action, it raised three pleas in law, alleging, respectively, infringement of its right to have its case handled within a reasonable time and failure to state reasons in the contested decision, breach of the principle of the rule of law in Poland, and manifest errors in assessing the EU interest in pursuing the examination of the complaint. By its judgment of 9 February 2022, the General Court upholds the action and annuls the contested decision in its entirety. On this occasion, it examines for the first time the impact of systemic or generalised deficiencies in the rule of law in a Member State on determining the competition authority that is best placed to examine a complaint. It also provides important clarifications as regards the circumstances in which failure to comply with the reasonable time requirement is liable to lead to the annulment of a decision rejecting a complaint in the field of competition law.

Findings of the Court

In the first place, as regards the reasonable time principle, the General Court recalls, first, that observance of the reasonable time requirement in the conduct of administrative procedures relating to competition policy constitutes a general principle of EU law. Article 41(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union also reaffirms the reasonable time principle in respect of administrative procedures. Thus, the General Court points out that the Commission is under an obligation to decide on complaints in the field of competition law within a reasonable time.

However, the General Court states, secondly, that breach of the reasonable time principle is liable to lead to the annulment of a decision rejecting a complaint only where the applicant shows that the failure to comply with the reasonable time requirement has had an impact on his or her ability to defend his or her position in that procedure, which would in particular be the case if that failure had prevented him or her from gathering or submitting before the Commission factual or legal material concerning the anticompetitive practices complained of or the EU interest in investigating the case. In the light of those principles, the General Court finds that, in the present case, it is not necessary to rule on the European Commission’s compliance with the reasonable time principle, since the applicant has not adduced any evidence capable of showing that the alleged failure to comply with that requirement had an impact on its ability to defend its position in that procedure. Consequently, the General Court rules that the complaint alleging breach of the reasonable time principle is unfounded.