On 30 March 2026, members of the DPM and an external expert carried out an unannounced thematic visit to the Dolfka Boštjančič Draga Centre for Training, Work and Care. The purpose of the visit was to examine the use of a special protection measure (PVU).

During the visit, it was established that CUDV Draga applies a special protection measure involving restriction within a single room to certain users with the most severe emotional and behavioural disorders. This measure is used as a measure of last resort when less intrusive approaches fail to manage an individual’s dangerous behaviour. Although CUDV Draga has developed a positive behavioural support programme to assist users in situations of distress, the PVU is still used in certain cases. The DPM pointed out that such measures may only be carried out in a secure ward of a social welfare institution, where individuals must be accommodated in accordance with the provisions of the Mental Health Act (ZDZdr), which clearly defines the conditions and manner of their use. At the time of the visit, however, none of the users were accommodated in accordance with these provisions, although some were unable to leave their living premises independently.

The DPM discussed with representatives of CUDV Draga the need for the systematic regulation of the legal basis for restricting personal liberty in training institutions. The DPM also reminded the institution’s representatives that they must strictly comply with the provisions of the Mental Health Act when applying the PVU.

The DPM will prepare a report on the visit containing recommendations for improvement. The report will first be sent to the visited institution and, after receiving its response, also to the Ministry of a Solidarity-Based Future, with the Social Inspectorate informed thereof.

Civil society organisations across the EU are facing growing pressure which undermines their ability to safeguard fundamental rights and contribute meaningfully to democratic life, highlights the EU Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA) in its latest civic space assessment. The findings are published as the EU begins implementing its first ever EU Civil Society Strategy, which aims to strengthen civil society engagement and ensure an open and safe civic space across the EU.

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FRA’s report ‘Civic Space Update: Enabling civil society to uphold EU values and strengthen democracy’ shows that civil society organisations (CSOs) are facing growing challenges amid geopolitical instability, disinformation campaigns, and deepening social polarisation. According to FRA’s analysis, 67% of human rights organisations report online attacks or threats, 60% report negative media coverage or smear campaigns, 39% experience politically motivated funding cuts and 36% excessive administrative controls or audits. Organisations also report increased interference with freedoms of assembly and expression, including at demonstrations. 

EU Member States are taking steps to better protect and support civil society, but comprehensive strategies to protect an open civic space remain an exception. The persisting pressure on civic space highlights the need for more coherent and long‑term approaches in line with the EU’s Civil Society Strategy. 

FRA’s report recommends the following action at EU and Member State levels to protect and strengthen civic space: 

• Improve monitoring: strengthen data collection and analysis of civic space developments, including of early warning signals. 
• Provide national support: develop or update strategies to protect civil society and address disinformation campaigns targeting civil society actors.
• Protect freedoms: safeguard freedoms of association, assembly, and expression, ensuring that legislation does not disproportionately restrict civic space. 
• Enhance participation: allow for timely and meaningful input from CSOs in policy and law making, including when conducting human rights assessments. 
• Protect civil society actors: enhance protection measures for organisations under threat, including emergency support, legal assistance, and cybersecurity. 
• Secure funding: guarantee broad and non-discriminatory access to funding sources and mechanisms, in line with international standards and EU law. 

In support of the EU’s efforts to protect civic space, FRA will work with the European Commission, civil society organisations, and international organisations to strengthen monitoring. This will include establishing an online information hub offering access to existing monitoring data, reports, and resources for protecting civil society. 

The report is based on data and information collected by Franet, FRA’s multidisciplinary research network. It is further informed by a consultation FRA conducted in 2024 with CSOs participating in its Fundamental Rights Platform. The findings are complemented by desk research, interviews, stakeholder meetings and exchanges with intergovernmental organisations. 

The report covers developments up to January 2025 across all EU Member States, as well as Albania, North Macedonia and Serbia.

Protocol No. 12 to the European Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“ECHR”) is still not part of the laws of Malta, despite its entry into force in Malta as an international treaty on the 1 April 2016

Introduction

Protocol No. 12 was adopted by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe on the 26 June 2000 and was opened for signature by contracting States on the 4 November 2000, being the 50th anniversary of the signing of the ECHR at Palazzo Barberini in Rome.  After the required threshold of ten (10) ratifications was reached, the Protocol came into force on 1 April 2005.  Malta ratified the Protocol on the 11 December 2015 and came into force on the 1 April 2016: ten (10) years today.

Importance

The essence of Protocol No. 12 lies in Article 1, which provides for a general prohibition of discrimination and its foundation as an independent right. Although Article 14 of the ECHR forbids discrimination, the provision does so only in relation to the enjoyment of the rights specifically protected by the Convention. Protocol No. 12 goes further, establishes a general prohibition of discrimination in the exercise of any right provided by law or by public authorities, and creates a free-standing equality clause, extending protection beyond the structure and operation of Article 14.  The Protocol addresses discrimination by public authorities in a broad range of administrative and legislative actions.  The leading judgement on the Protocol is Sejdić and Finci v. Bosnia and Herzegovina (Grand Chamber – 22 December 2009).  The Protocol does not impose a general duty to eliminate all inequalities but only those that constitute unjustified discrimination; not every difference in treatment is unlawful.

Obligation

By ratifying Protocol No. 12, Malta did undertake an international obligation to respect this enhanced and specific prohibition of discrimination. Once ratified, the Protocol became binding under international law and fell within the supervisory jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights (“ECtHR”).

Absence

Yet the absence of domestic implementation means that Maltese courts cannot apply Protocol No. 12 when adjudicating discrimination claims. 

This fact was confirmed by the Constitutional Court in its judgements in re “Jonathan Ferris v. Commissioner of Police” of the 19 January 2026, in re “Mark Calleja v. Minister of Education and Employment et.” of the 25 June 2025, and in re “Philip Pirotta et v. The Hon. Prime Minister et.” of the 25 June 2025. 

This is a serious shortcoming that remains unaddressed till this very day, despite repeated calls by the Office of the Ombudsman in its public statements in Malta and abroad, in its reports and annual Ombudplans.

Ratification ten years back was a meaningful step forward.  However depriving persons from seeking redress before the Maltese courts because Protocol No. 12 is not part of the laws of Malta is a fundamental concern that remains unresolved.  A decade on, the absence of effective domestic remedial action continues to undermine the sound objectives that ratification brought about.

Balance

The ECHR incorporates a delicate institutional balance between national authorities and the supervisory jurisdiction of the ECtHR.

Central is the principle of subsidiarity, whereby the primary responsibility for protecting Convention rights lies with the domestic legal order of each contracting State. The Strasbourg Court acts only as a supervisory mechanism when domestic systems fail to secure those rights.

Against this background, the fact that Protocol No. 12 to the ECHR in Malta was not made part of the laws of Malta and therefore cannot be invoked before Maltese courts gives rise to doubts on the implementation of the principle of subsidiarity which is fundamental in the Convention.

Subsidiarity

Through their domestic institutions, contracting States are the primary guarantors of the rights that derive from the Convention.  The ECHR was made part of the laws of Malta on the 19 August 1987 by means of the European Convention Act (Chapter 319 of the laws of Malta).  To date, Protocol No. 12  is still not part of Chapter 319.

The ECtHR acts as a subsidiary supervisory body. It intervenes only after all domestic rights of action have been exhausted and when domestic legal systems fail to protect adequately rights arising out of the Convention.

The logic is both constitutional and practical.

The Convention is an international treaty, not a supranational constitution. Its effectiveness therefore depends largely on the willingness and ability of national institutions to enforce the rights it guarantees.

Subsidiarity presupposes that persons should be enabled to seek  effective protection within their own national legal systems before turning to Strasbourg. Because Protocol No. 12 is not part of the laws of Malta, persons seeking protection have to turn to the ECtHR directly to the exclusion of Maltese courts.

Tension

When a State ratifies a Convention protocol but does not transpose the provisions of the protocol into its domestic corpus juris a structural tension emerges between international obligations and domestic enforceability.  In the case of Malta, ratification means that the State is bound by Protocol No. 12 under international law. However, the lack of domestic implementation means that persons cannot rely upon it before Maltese courts.

Weakness

If a right exists only at the international level but not within domestic law, national courts cannot apply it directly. Consequently, the domestic legal order may fail to provide the first line of protection envisaged by the Convention.

If a right cannot be invoked domestically, the “exhaustion” requirement becomes a problem because although the Strasbourg Court may still examine a case, the absence of domestic adjudication deprives the Court of the benefit of national judicial reasoning, which is so important and relevant for persons who want to seek redress before their domestic courts rather than be obliged to proceed directly to Strasbourg to avail themselves of the protection of their rights. 

This matter is most relevant taking into account that the Strasbourg Court has thousands of pending cases to consider and decide, despite its tremendous efforts and those of its support staff.  Therefore, resorting directly to the ECtHR should not in principle be the right way to treat persons in Malta that claim freedom from discrimination as determined in Protocol No. 12.

The Convention functions most effectively when national courts are in a position at law to apply its standards internally. When this does not happen, then the Strasbourg Court becomes a court of first instance, a circumstance that the principle of subsidiarity was designed to avoid. 

Therefore, while ratification without transposition in domestic law does not formally breach the Convention, the spirit of subsidiarity is put into very serious question.

Prejudice

Without being enabled to take their case before the Maltese courts, persons who seek the protection of Protocol No. 12 in their claim on discrimination by the public authorities are left without no option other than to pursue their claim before the ECtHR.  Litigation of this nature is lengthy, complex, and costly.

Commitment

In systems that value the rule of law, ratification of an international human-rights instrument requires from a State a legal commitment to respect and enforce the provisions of that instrument, including domestic legislative implementation and guarantees.

Conclusion

The Office of the Ombudsman as a constitutionally protected oversight institution plays an important role in encouraging compliance with international human-rights standards. The ECHR functions through a carefully constructed sharing of responsibility, including where the domestic courts and the ECtHR are concerned.

At the heart of that responsibility is the principle of subsidiarity in the sense that domestic institutions should provide the primary protection of human rights.  Ratification of Protocol No. 12 by Malta without its incorporation in the laws of Malta is a legal set-back. 

Incorporating Protocol No. 12 into domestic law strengthens the protection of equality, enhances the role of national courts, and reaffirms the central principle that human rights should be secured first and foremost at home.

The matter should therefore be addressed, remedied and resolved without further unnecessary delay.

For the first time in its history, the Czech Republic has appointed a Children’s Ombudsman. Members of Parliament have elected Martin Beneš to the position. He will serve as a defender of children’s rights for the next six years.

In an interview for the  Human Rights Bulletin, Beneš outlined the key priorities he intends to focus on in his new role:

“My priority is to ensure a well-functioning and regionally balanced system of social and legal protection of children, including all its related structures. This includes thorough preparation for the upcoming ban on placing children under the age of seven in institutional care, which will come into force in two years, as well as the broader reform of institutional care. I also see as essential addressing the needs of children and young people in the area of mental health, and ensuring equal access not only to education but also to other basic needs, such as healthcare and decent housing.”

Martin Beneš

Martin Beneš has spent most of his professional career at a District Court, first serving as a judge in the commercial division and later as the court’s president. In 2016, he became a guardianship judge, a position he held until now. In this role, he worked within an interdisciplinary team, applying the principles of problem-solving justice.

In addition to his judicial career, he has been active as a consultant and lecturer, focusing on guardianship, shared parenting, and parental disputes resolution. He has collaborated with organisations including the Ministry of Justice, the Judicial Academy and the Czech Bar Association.

He has completed several professional placements, including a six-month internship at the European Court of Human Rights. He is also a member of the Active Reserve of the Czech Armed Forces.

Establishment of the Children’s Ombudsman

The Children’s Ombudsman institution began operating in the Czech Republic on 1 July 2025. For the first eight months, the Deputy Children’s Ombudsman, Vít Alexander Schorm carried out this role. 

Until recently, the Czech Republic was one of the last EU countries without a dedicated Children’s Ombudsman. This gap reflected an outstanding obligation stemming from the Convention on the Rights of the Child, as well as recommendations from the United Nations and the Council of Europe.

Several years of debate preceded the current legal framework establishing the Children’s Ombudsman. A major breakthrough came in April 2024, when the government approved the amendment. The bill was then submitted to the Chamber of Deputies, which gave it final approval in January 2025. It subsequently passed the Senate in February 2025, completing the legislative process with the signature of President Petr Pavel in March 2025.