Link: https://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2025-05/cp250060de.pdf

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PRESSEMITTEILUNG Nr. 60/25

Luxemburg, den 14. Mai 2025 Urteil des Gerichts in der Rechtssache T-36/23 | Stevi und The New York Times / Kommission

Zugang zu Dokumenten: Die Entscheidung der Kommission, mit der einer Journalistin der New York Times der Zugang zu zwischen Präsidentin von der Leyen und dem CEO von Pfizer ausgetauschten Textnachrichten verweigert wurde, wird für nichtig erklärt

Gestützt auf die Verordnung über den Zugang zu Dokumenten1 beantragte Matina Stevi, eine für die Tageszeitung The New York Times tätige Journalistin, bei der Europäischen Kommission Zugang zu allen zwischen der Präsidentin Ursula von der Leyen und dem Chief executive officer (CEO) von Pfizer, Albert Bourla, in der Zeit vom 1. Januar 2021 bis zum 11. Mai 2022 ausgetauschten Textnachrichten. Die Kommission lehnte diesen Antrag mit der Begründung ab, dass sie nicht im Besitz der von dem Antrag erfassten Dokumente sei. Frau Stevi und The New York Times beantragten daraufhin beim Gericht der Europäischen Union, die Entscheidung der Kommission für nichtig zu erklären.

Mit seinem Urteil gibt das Gericht der Klage statt und erklärt die Entscheidung der Kommission für nichtig.

Die Verordnung über den Zugang zu Dokumenten soll dem Recht der Öffentlichkeit auf Zugang zu Dokumenten, die sich im Besitz der EU-Organe befinden, größtmögliche Wirksamkeit verschaffen. In der Regel sollten somit alle Dokumente der Organe für die Öffentlichkeit zugänglich sein. Erklärt jedoch ein Organ in Beantwortung eines Zugangsantrags, dass ein Dokument nicht existiere, so wird entsprechend der Vermutung der Richtigkeit dieser Behauptung angenommen, dass das Dokument nicht existiert. Diese Vermutung kann jedoch auf der Grundlage von vom Antragsteller vorgelegten relevanten und übereinstimmenden Anhaltspunkten entkräftet werden.

Im vorliegenden Fall beruhen die Antworten der Kommission zu den angeforderten Textnachrichten während des gesamten Verfahrens entweder auf Hypothesen oder auf wechselnden oder ungenauen Informationen. Dagegen haben Frau Stevi und The New York Times relevante und übereinstimmende Anhaltspunkte dafür vorgelegt, dass im Rahmen des Kaufs von Impfstoffen durch die Kommission bei Pfizer während der Covid-19-Pandemie zwischen der Kommissionspräsidentin und dem Chief executive officer von Pfizer ein wiederholter Austausch, insbesondere in Form von Textnachrichten, stattgefunden hat. Damit ist es ihnen gelungen, die Vermutung der Nichtexistenz und des Nichtbesitzes der angeforderten Dokumente zu entkräften.

In einer solchen Situation kann sich die Kommission nicht mit der Behauptung begnügen, dass sie nicht im Besitz der angeforderten Dokumente sei, sondern muss plausible Erklärungen abgeben, die es der Öffentlichkeit und dem Gericht ermöglichen, zu verstehen, warum diese Dokumente nicht auffindbar sind. Die Kommission hat weder im Detail erklärt, welche Art von Nachforschungen sie betrieben hat, um diese Dokumente zu finden, noch, wo sie nach ihnen gesucht hat. Somit hat sie keine plausible Erklärung gegeben, um den Nichtbesitz der angeforderten Dokumente zu rechtfertigen. Darüber hinaus hat die Kommission nicht hinreichend klargestellt, ob die angeforderten Textnachrichten gelöscht wurden und ob in diesem Fall die Löschung freiwillig oder automatisch erfolgt ist oder ob das Mobiltelefon der Präsidentin inzwischen ausgetauscht wurde.

Schließlich hat die Kommission auch nicht plausibel dargelegt, warum sie der Ansicht war, dass die im Zusammenhang mit dem Kauf von Covid-19-Impfstoffen ausgetauschten Textnachrichten keine wichtigen Informationen oder solche Informationen enthielten, die Folgemaßnahmen nach sich gezogen hätten und deren Aufbewahrung sichergestellt werden müsse.

HINWEIS: Die Nichtigkeitsklage zielt auf die Nichtigerklärung einer unionsrechtswidrigen Handlung der Unionsorgane ab. Sie kann bei dem Gerichtshof bzw. dem Gericht unter bestimmten Voraussetzungen von Mitgliedstaaten, Organen der Union oder natürlichen oder juristischen Personen erhoben werden. Ist die Klage begründet, wird die unionsrechtswidrige Handlung für nichtig erklärt. Entsteht dadurch eine Regelungslücke, hat das betreffende Organ diese zu schließen.

HINWEIS: Gegen die Entscheidung des Gerichts kann innerhalb von zwei Monaten und zehn Tagen nach ihrer Zustellung beim Gerichtshof ein auf Rechtsfragen beschränktes Rechtsmittel eingelegt werden.

Zur Verwendung durch die Medien bestimmtes nicht amtliches Dokument, das das Gericht nicht bindet. Der Volltext und gegebenenfalls die Zusammenfassung des Urteils werden am Tag der Verkündung auf der CuriaWebsite veröffentlicht. Pressekontakt: Hartmut Ost ✆ +352 4303-3255 Filmaufnahmen von der Verkündung des Urteils sind abrufbar über „Europe by Satellite“ ✆ +32 2 2964106

Link: https://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2025-05/cp250060es.pdf

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COMUNICADO DE PRENSA n.º 60/25

Luxemburgo, 14 de mayo de 2025

Sentencia del Tribunal General en el asunto T-36/23 | Stevi y The New York Times/Comisión

Acceso a documentos: se anula la decisión de la Comisión que denegó a una periodista del New York Times el acceso a los mensajes de texto intercambiados entre la presidenta von der Leyen y el presidente y director ejecutivo de Pfizer

Mediante un recurso basado en el Reglamento relativo al acceso a los documentos, 1 Matina Stevi, una periodista que trabaja para el diario The New York Times, solicitó a la Comisión Europea que le diera acceso a la totalidad de los mensajes de texto intercambiados entre la presidenta Ursula von der Leyen y Albert Bourla, presidente y director ejecutivo de Pfizer, entre el 1 de enero de 2021 y el 11 de mayo de 2022. La Comisión denegó dicha solicitud aduciendo que no tenía en su poder los documentos a los que esta se refería. La Sra. Stevi y The New York Times solicitaron al Tribunal General que anulara la decisión de la Comisión.

En su sentencia, el Tribunal General estima el recurso y anula la decisión de la Comisión.

El Tribunal General recuerda que el Reglamento relativo al acceso a los documentos tiene por objeto conferir, de la manera más completa posible, el derecho de acceso del público a los documentos que obran en poder de las instituciones. De este modo, y por regla general, todos los documentos de las instituciones deben ser accesibles al público. No obstante, cuando, en respuesta a una solicitud de acceso, una institución afirma que un documento no existe, se presume la inexistencia de este, en virtud de la presunción de veracidad de que goza esa declaración. A pesar de ello, esta presunción puede ser refutada sobre la base de elementos pertinentes y concordantes aportados por el solicitante.

En el presente asunto, el Tribunal General subraya que, a lo largo de todo el procedimiento, las respuestas proporcionadas por la Comisión en relación con los mensajes de texto solicitados se basan o bien en suposiciones, o bien en informaciones cambiantes o imprecisas. En cambio, la Sra. Stevi y The New York Times aportaron elementos pertinentes y concordantes que describen la existencia de intercambios —en particular en forma de mensajes de texto— entre la presidenta de la Comisión y el presidente y director ejecutivo de Pfizer, en el contexto de la compra de vacunas por la Comisión a la referida empresa durante la pandemia de COVID-19. De este modo, la Sra. Stevi y The New York Times han conseguido refutar la presunción de inexistencia y de no posesión de los documentos solicitados.

En una situación como la descrita, la Comisión no puede limitarse a afirmar que no tiene en su poder los documentos solicitados, sino que debe presentar explicaciones creíbles que permitan al público y al Tribunal General entender por qué no pueden encontrarse esos documentos. La Comisión no explicó en detalle el tipo de búsquedas que supuestamente se realizaron para encontrar esos documentos, ni especificó los lugares en que esas búsquedas se llevaron supuestamente a cabo. Por lo tanto, no proporcionó una explicación plausible para justificar que no estaba en posesión de los documentos solicitados. Además, la Comisión no aclaró suficientemente si los mensajes de texto solicitados se habían suprimido y, de ser así, si la supresión había sido voluntaria o automática, o si el teléfono móvil de la presidenta había sido sustituido en ese intervalo de tiempo.

Por último, la Comisión tampoco explicó de manera plausible por qué consideró que los mensajes de texto intercambiados en el contexto de la compra de vacunas contra la COVID-19 no contenían información importante o que precisara de un seguimiento, cuya conservación debiera garantizarse.

NOTA: El recurso de anulación sirve para solicitar la anulación de los actos de las instituciones de la Unión contrarios al Derecho de la Unión. Bajo ciertos requisitos, los Estados miembros, las instituciones europeas y los particulares pueden interponer recurso de anulación ante el Tribunal de Justicia o ante el Tribunal General. Si el recurso se declara fundado, el acto queda anulado y la institución de que se trate debe colmar el eventual vacío jurídico creado por la anulación de dicho acto. NOTA: Contra las resoluciones del Tribunal General puede interponerse recurso de casación ante el Tribunal de Justicia, limitado a las cuestiones de Derecho, en un plazo de dos meses y diez días a partir de la notificación de la resolución. Documento no oficial, destinado a los medios de comunicación y que no vincula al Tribunal General. El texto íntegro y, en su caso, el resumen de la sentencia se publican en el sitio CURIA el día de su pronunciamiento. Contactos con la prensa: Cristina López Roca ✆ (+352) 4303 3667. Tiene a su disposición imágenes del pronunciamiento de la sentencia en «Europe by Satellite» ✆ (+32) 2 2964106.

“A rights-based approach is essential in every social and public policy,” Ms. Ballanca emphasized, reminding attendees that the Constitution of the Republic of Albania, from its very preamble, defines the establishment of a rule-of-law state as one that guarantees fundamental freedoms and human rights.

She underscored the importance of institutional and societal awareness in upholding this principle, particularly in an era marked by shifting dynamics that increasingly impact both security and individual rights.

“This message must be continuously reinforced and become embedded in our institutional and social conscience,” she stated.

The conference gathered a diverse group of experts, academics, and professionals from across disciplines to explore the pressing challenges surrounding justice, security, and human rights, both within Albania and on a global scale. The event served as a platform for sharing innovative ideas and practical solutions to contemporary legal and societal issues.

According to the assessment of the Human Rights Ombudsman of the Republic of Slovenia (Ombudsman), by adopting an amendment to the ordinance that, among other things, regulates the extension of the operating hours of catering establishments, the Municipality of Novo Mesto violated Paragraph 3 of Article 153 of the Constitution of the Republic of Slovenia, according to which, implementing regulations and other general acts must be in accordance with the Constitution and laws. Namely, by referring to the Decree on Events, the Municipality of Novo Mesto arbitrarily allowed itself a significantly higher level of noise, which caterers were still allowed to cause in accordance with the Decree on Noise. The Ombudsman informed the Municipality of Novo Mesto of its opinion, but since the Municipality of Novo Mesto rejected it, the Ombudsman proposed that the Ministry of the Environment, Climate and Energy (MOPE) carry out an inspection. MOPE agreed with the Ombudsman's assessment and ordered the Municipality of Novo Mesto to repeal the illegal provision of the Ordinance, which the Municipality of Novo Mesto finally carried out – albeit with a significant delay.

The Ombudsman considered the complaint of a resident of the Municipality of Novo Mesto alleging that the Municipality of Novo Mesto had exceeded the powers granted to it under the Hospitality Act (ZGos) and the associated “Rules on the criteria for determining the operating hours of catering establishments and farms where catering activities are carried out” (the Rules). The complainant highlighted two aspects or complaints against the conduct of the Municipality of Novo Mesto. According to him, with the adoption of the “Ordinance on amendments and supplements to the Ordinance on the criteria for issuing permits for operation during extended operating hours to catering establishments and farms where catering activities are carried out in the area of ​​the City Municipality of Novo Mesto” (the Ordinance) in 2021, residents of the Municipality of Novo Mesto were deprived of the protection of their rights due to the lack of the possibility of effective legal protection. According to the complainant, the time from 10pm to midnight was determined by the amendment to the Ordinance as regular operating hours, which the caterer merely reports to the municipality. In his opinion, this is not an administrative procedure in which individuals with a demonstrated legal interest could participate, as was the case when operating hours in this interval could only be extended on the basis of a specific application and assessment of an individual case. At the same time, the Ministry of the Interior also criticised that the fact that the aforementioned Ordinance, in which it referred to the “Regulation on the method of using sound devices that cause noise at gatherings and events” (Regulation on Events), unacceptably lowered the level of noise protection, which is otherwise primarily prescribed by limit values ​​under the “Regulation on limit values ​​of noise indicators in the environment” (Regulation on Noise).

Regarding the allegation of denial of legal protection based on the amended Ordinance, the Ombudsman contacted the Ministry of the Economy, Tourism and Sports (MGTŠ) and also the Ministry of the Interior of the Republic of Slovenia with an inquiry. Based on the explanations received, the Ombudsman assessed that when interpreting the question of which type of administrative procedure, i.e. whether it would be most appropriate to conduct an abbreviated or special administrative procedure from the perspective of implementing all principles of administrative procedure and their mutual balancing, different interpretations are possible. In the Ombudsman's opinion, an unambiguous answer to this question, on which the actual scope of available legal remedies and their actual effectiveness also depend, can only be given by the Administrative Court of the Republic of Slovenia in the event of disagreement with an individual decision (consent), and with regard to the possible constitutionality of the Rules and the ZGos, only by the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Slovenia, the intervention of which is generally only considered if legal remedies against individual legal acts based on disputed general legal acts have been exhausted. The Ombudsman referred the complainant to the use of the available legal remedies in this regard.

Regarding the inappropriate reference of the municipal Ordinance to the Ordinance on Events, the Ombudsman, after examining the applicable regulation, was able to agree with the complainant's complaints. The Ombudsman addressed its opinion to the Ministry of the Interior of the Republic of Slovenia in this regard, expecting that the established unconstitutionality would be eliminated. Since the Ministry of the Interior of the Republic of Slovenia did not agree with the Ombudsman's opinion, the Ombudsman proposed to the competent Ministry of the Interior of the Republic of Slovenia to carry out supervision or take action, as provided for in the State Administration Act (ZDU-1) in relation to local community bodies. The Ministry of the Interior of the Republic of Slovenia followed the Ombudsman's proposal and called on the Ministry of the Interior of the Republic of Slovenia to repeal the illegal provision of the Ordinance within 30 days or at the next session of the municipal council and to bring it into line with applicable legislation and relevant regulations. On 6 February 2025, the Ministry of the Interior of the Republic of Slovenia finally (albeit with a significant delay) followed the call of the Ministry of the Interior by adopting the Ordinance on Amendments and Supplements to the “Ordinance on the criteria for issuing approvals for extended operating hours to catering establishments and farms providing catering services in the area of ​​the Municipality of Novo Mesto (Ordinance 2025), and published it on 12 February 2025 in the Dolenjska Uradni List No. 3/25, thereby harmonising the aforementioned Ordinance 2025 with regulations in the field of environmental protection from noise.

In this case, the Ombudsman considered the intervention successful and the complaint well-founded.17.0-1/2023

The Commissioner participated in the European Dialogue on Internet Governance, which had the overarching theme: “Safeguarding human rights by balancing regulation and innovation”. Below is the published version of his introductory remarks.

“Dear Ministers, dear Secretary General of EuroDIG, dear friends,

last Saturday, we watched as the newly elected Pope explained why he had chosen the name Leo. He made reference to a predecessor of his, Leo XIII, and explained that that Pope had carried out his tasks in the context of the First Great Industrial Revolution and now he, Leo XIV, must respond to another great industrial revolution, the revolution on artificial intelligence (AI).

In other words, he must engage the challenges of, and I quote, “human dignity, justice and labour”. Now, Pope Leo has his faith-based tools to engage these great issues of society and we also have our tools. Above all, we have the toolbox of human rights, the toolbox of the great laws and institutions which we have so carefully crafted since the Second World War.

A starting assumption when I make that statement is that we already have a lot of guidance in terms of the operation of the internet and of artificial intelligence. We have multiple treaties negotiated over years, all of which are binding on states. We have at the national level many instruments and bodies already in place to provide guidance in these contexts.

We have privacy laws. We have the operation of privacy oversight bodies. In the EU, there is the GDPR.

And even in the private sector, we have considerable existing human rights guidance for how business should do its work in every sector. I think above all else, of the United Nations' Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights. So, we are not operating in some kind of a legal terra nullius.

But of course, we have long recognised that we do need dedicated instruments to regulate the specific context of the internet and artificial intelligence. That is the frame in which we have seen at least three very important initiatives.

The first is the negotiation in this house of the AI Framework Convention.

Then, in the EU setting, there is the EU AI Act and the Digital Services Act.

But before I go any further in praising such instruments, I have to engage the challenge behind the title for our conference, as previous speakers have done as well.

There is increasingly loud rhetoric out there in society that somehow regulation gets in the way of innovation and the time has come to talk less about regulation and more about innovation. There is a context for all of this that somehow Europe lags behind the rest of the world. It is suggested that if it was not so besotted with regulation, it would be so much more successful.

I take the opportunity this afternoon to refute that assertion. Let me give you four reasons.

The first is that our states have a duty to keep us safe. It is as simple as that. Wherever there is risk, our states have an obligation, be it under international human rights law or be it under any other body of law, to protect us.

They must protect us in the context of the areas we are discussing today, as with any other.

Second, it is not just about protection. It is also about my conviction that safe technology is more trustworthy technology and more trustworthy technology ultimately will win out, including commercially. I am confident of this, perhaps not immediately, perhaps not even in the medium term, but in the longer term. The safer the technology, the more the pickup and the application and the use across the world.

Third, the assumption that somehow we lag behind in Europe because of regulation is most loudly proclaimed by those who clearly pay no attention to the content of the regulation, because the principal European instruments are subtle, nimble and well attuned and full of the nuance necessary to avoid the risk of stifling innovation.

Take the Council of Europe AI Framework Convention. The Framework Convention contains very powerful, important, essential principles, but then leaves a wide margin to states in how to actually deliver them, how to implement them, how to convert them into national regulation. That is not a stifling of innovation. That is a promoting of innovation.

Look also at the AI Act of the European Union with its so-called risk pyramid. The risk pyramid is a very deliberately, carefully and smartly designed method whereby most AI will not fall under a strict external oversight. Rather, its safety will be determined by self-regulation.

The fourth and the final of my reasons to refute these claims is because I simply do not buy into the zero-sum game, the idea that more regulation in Europe stifles European innovation and so forth. And I am very glad that recent academic research supports me in this regard.

I am particularly impressed by an important article published by Professor Anu Bradford of Columbia University just last year. She gave five reasons of why Europe lags behind in innovation.

First, she mentioned the absence in the EU of a digital single market.

Second, she pointed to the European reality that we have shallow and fragmented capital markets. You cannot get the money to do the research.

Third, she mentioned how in Europe many countries have punitive bankruptcy laws which make industry reluctant to engage on risk.

Fourth, she spoke to a more general cultural risk aversion on this continent, quite at odds with the culture of, let us say, the United States.

Fifth, she referred to how we limit immigration into our countries and how that impedes access to the global talent market and leads to skills deficit.

Again, her assertion is that these five reasons are the base for Europe lagging behind, not regulation.

So, my friends, as I wrap up these remarks, what I would call on us to do is not waste time on a regulation versus innovation reflection. Get rid of the zero-sum game approach and let's focus instead on getting the best possible regulation.

I will name just briefly six things we can do now.

One is to get the Framework Convention ratified, get the sufficient number of ratifications in place so that it can come into force.

Secondly, let's make sure that the EU does not lose its nerve. Let's make sure that it insists on full enforcement of the Digital Services Act.

Third, as we move along the pathway to the coming into force in the EU of the AI Act, let's make sure that it is set up both at the EU level and at the EU member state level and whereby it will genuinely protect all of our human rights.

Fourth, we need to support the private sector to do its own self-regulation in the regulatory context. One obvious need is to fill the space with codes of practice. It is already happening, but more is needed.

Fifth, we need smart, clever human rights assessment tools to be used both for regulation, external and self-regulation. I would like to join with the Secretary General and other speakers in a shout out for the HUDERIA tool, which I believe is groundbreaking and will be of great importance.

Sixth and final of my observations about regulation is that it is not finished. We now have to confront artificial general intelligence and artificial superintelligence.

I suspect that our current regulatory models will need to be further supplemented. So, the examination of where we need to go next is no less an important one as how we deliver what we have now.

As we engage these issues, let us again, if I may paraphrase Professor Bradford, let's recalibrate the debate.

Let's avoid the false choice between tech regulation and tech innovation. Let us show how we can and must have both.

Thank you very much."

• Download the speech - CommHR(2025)29